CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND THE DUTY TO AID
THE DISTRESSED
SAMUEL FREEMANt

The aim of this Article is to address some of the normative, as
opposed to the purely metaphysical, issues raised by Michael
Moore's analysis of the criminal law's act requirement. On several
occasions, Professor Moore himself recognizes the role of ethics in
finally settling issues of the application of the metaphysics of action
to the criminal law. For example, he acknowledges that, ultimately,
moral criteria are needed to determine whether an event is the
consequence of a basic act or its circumstance.1 Moreover, he
explains that the orthodox view of Bentham and Austin (that in
addition to a basic action, all crimes involve but two dimensions:
circumstance and result)2 is based on practical, and not metaphysical, concerns.' Moore argues that it is compatible with his metaphysical realism to accept that the categories of actions applied by
the criminal law-killing, mayhem, assault, theft, fraud, etc.-are
conventional: they do not denote natural events or kinds, but
rather are concepts that have their origins in the practical interests
of beings of our kind.4
Moore's appreciation of the role of ethics and practical concerns
in this area is commendable. Given the practical ends of the
criminal law in a democracy, it is not only expedient but also
desirable to avoid using the metaphysics of action as much as
possible in the public realm. High metaphysics, including the metaphysics of action, is one area on which citizens in a democracy
(including those within the legal community) cannot agree, even
under the best of circumstances. Insofar as it is necessary to turn
to metaphysics, it should be as a last resort, and then only to the
degree necessary to resolve judicial and moral issues. Metaphysics

t Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.D.,
Harvard University; J.D., University of North Carolina; A.B., University of North
Carolina. I am indebted to jay Wallace for many helpful discussions that led me to
clarify the ideas and arguments in this essay. I am grateful to Ari Burstein and David
Anderman for helpful comments and suggestions regarding necessary revisions.
' See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1993).
2 See id. at 209-10 (arguing that a third element, the "nature" of the crime, is not
necessary for description of the act).
3 See id. at 201-02.
4 See id.
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should be seen not as the guide, but as the handmaiden to democratic adjudication and legislation. It should be used to resolve
conceptual difficulties in principles and norms which themselves
have their bases not in metaphysical considerations, but in the
practical necessities and interests of democratic citizens. Moore
seems to have a more robust view of the role of metaphysics in a
democracy. This accounts for his wonderfully extensive treatment
of the metaphysics of action as applied to the criminal law.
The goal of this discussion is to make a stronger case for the
criminalization of certain omissions than that presented by Moore.
In particular, I shall argue for a version of what is known as the duty
to rescue, or sometimes "good samaritan" laws. As Moore indicates,
in Anglo-American law, certain specific failures to take action are
punishable and are therefore exceptions to the general act requirement.5 Criminal liability is imposed for the failure to aid within
special relationships such as those between parents and their small
6
children, husbands and wives, or employers and their employees.
Criminal liability is also imposed for neglect of professional duties,
as in the case of physicians or nurses and their patients, lifeguards
and the swimmers they are paid to watch, and railroad gatemen and
approaching motorists.7 There are also other exceptions to the
general rule.' However, there is generally no common law duty
(and in the absence of statute, no duty whatsoever) to rescue a
stranger in distress, even if one can do so without risk or inconvenience to oneself.' This contrasts with the continental rule, which

' See id. at 57. On Moore's account, "the criminal law's act requirement requires
that there be a simple bodily movement that is caused by a volition before criminal
liability attaches, and that such a movement is all the action a person ever performs."
Id. at 45.
6 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
§ 26, at 184 (1972).
7 See id. § 26, at 185. For examples of cases involving the liability of gatemen to
the public, see State v. Benton, 187 A. 609, 616 (Del. Ch. 1936), and State v.
Harrison, 152 A. 867, 868 (N.J. 1931) (contract between railroad and gateman, but
latter owes duty to the public as well as to the railroad). But cf. Anderson v. State, 11
S.W. 33, 33-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1889) (brakeman has no duty to signal engineer to
stop train when he sees child on track, since that is not what he was hired to do). For
an illuminating discussion of crimes of omission, see LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND
GUILTY MINDS 135-53 (1987).
' For example, if one voluntarily assumes care, one has a duty to see the job
through. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 6, § 26, at 185. Also, a landowner or
merchant has a duty to act affirmatively to provide for the safety of those invited onto
his premises. See id. at 186.
' See id. at 183. Vermont has adopted a duty to rescue statute. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (requiring one to give reasonable assistance to someone
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has long held that one is liable for the failure to come to the
assistance of others in distress.1
Professor Moore, in his discussion of the act requirement in the
criminal law, "raises the possibility that perhaps Anglo-American
criminal law is mistaken in those rare instances where it genuinely
imposes omission liability. Perhaps there ought not to be such
crimes, recognizing that presently they do exist. " " Nonetheless,
although he considers this possibility, he does not, in the end,
subscribe to it. He seems to conclude that the few exceptions to the
act requirement that presently exist are justified on the ground that
the moral wrong of omission in these few cases warrants retribution,12 and that the Anglo-American rule of not punishing strangers for failure to rescue is generally sound. 3
I aim to reconsider Moore's conclusion. Some cases of failure
to rescue those in distress are sufficiently wrong to warrant
retribution. Moreover, retribution is compatible with maintaining
a liberty worth having. 4 The problem then becomes that of
defining a positive legal duty to aid the distressed that is sufficiently
specific to escape the usual objections of vagueness, unfairness,
etc.15 Resorting to Kant's typology of duty, the aim here will not
be to specify such a statute-that is ajob for the drafters-but rather
to provide a philosophical justification and framework for statutes,
existing or imagined, which impose a legal duty to aid the distressed. The argument throughout is guided by the resources of the
democratic social contract tradition, as expounded in the works of
the major proponents of that tradition. 6 In terms of this tradi-

in danger of grave physical harm if there is no risk involved).
10 See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 323(c) (F.R.G.) (imposing criminal liability
for failure to rescue).
" MOORE, supra note 1, at 34.
12See id. at 59 ("[T]he injustice of not punishing such wrongs outweighs the

diminution of liberty such punishment entails."). Moore's argument is explored in
greater detail below. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
'3 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 57.
14The liberty safeguarded by the duty to aid the distressed is not, of course, the
liberty of the offender; but then there is no moral value to a liberty to do wrong. See
infra
15 part V.
See infra parts IV-V.
16See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE (John
Ladd trans., 1965) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS]; IMMANUEL
KANT, ON THE OLD SAw: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY, BUT IT WON'T WORK IN
PRACTICE (John Silber ed., E.B. Ashton trans., 1974) (1793); JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698);JOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
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tion, a legal duty to aid the distressed is, under certain circumstances, compatible with democratic liberty and the good of all
individuals.
I. MOORE ON OMISSIONS

At the end of chapter 3 of Act and Crime, Moore summarizes his
defense of the orthodox view of the act requirement, and with it
Anglo-American law's current practice with regard to omissions, as
follows:
[1] There is and should be an act requirement, although it is and
should be subject to an exception in the case of certain omissions.
[2] Normatively, the retributive value of punishment justifies why
we should punish actions and that value (sometimes in conjunction
with the values of fairness and of liberty) also justifies why we
should punish only actions and not character, emotions, or
omissions. [3] The only exception to this is for those omissions
that violate our duties sufficiently that the injustice of not
punishing such wrongs outweighs the diminution of liberty such
punishment entails. 7
How are we to understand propositions [2] and [3]? At one
point in his discussion, Moore refers to Lord Thomas Macaulay's
well-known example in which Macaulay attempts to justify why the
penal code he proposed for India did not punish omissions:
"It will hardly be maintained that a surgeon ought to be treated as
a murderer for refusing to go from Calcutta to Meerut to perform
an operation, although it should be absolutely certain that this
surgeon was the only person in India who could perform it, and
that if it were not performed, the person who required it would
die." 8

CONTRACT (Rose M. Harrington trans., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1893) (1761).
17 MOORE, supra note 1, at 59.
" Id. at 55 (quoting THOMAS MACAULAY, NOTES ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE note
M (1837) (On Offences Against the Body), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF LORD
MACAULAY 493-94 (Lady Trevelyan ed., New York, Longmans, Green & Co. 1897)
(1837)). Just prior to the sentence quoted by Moore, Macaulay gives another
example:
[I]t will hardly be maintained that a man should be punished as a murderer
because he omitted to relieve a beggar, even though there might be the
clearest proof that the death of the beggar was the effect of this omission,
and that the man who omitted to give the alms knew that the death of the
beggar was likely to be the effect of the omission.
MACAULAY, supra, at 493.
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Although Moore agrees with Macaulay, it would be a mistake to

conclude that Moore's view is identical to Macaulay's. Macaulay
believes that one can be held criminally liable for omissions only
where there exists some special relationship (natural, institutional,
or contractual) between the parties that is otherwise recognized by
the criminal or civil law.19 In this vein, Macaulay states:
An omission is illegal ... if it be an offence, if it be a breach of
some direction of law, or if it be such a wrong as would be a good
ground for a civil action.
We cannot defend this rule better than by giving a few
illustrations of the way in which it will operate. A. omits to give
Z. food, and by that omission voluntarily causes Z.'s death. Is this
murder? Under our rule it is murder if A. was Z.'s gaoler [jailer],
directed by the law to furnish Z. with food. It is murder if Z. was
the infant child of A., and had therefore a legal right to sustenance, which right a Civil Court would enforce against A. It is
murder if Z. was a bedridden invalid, and A. a nurse hire to feed
Z. It is murder if A. was detaining Z. in unlawful confinement,
and had thus contracted.., a legal obligation to furnish Z., during
the continuance of the confinement, with necessaries. It is not
murder if Z. is a beggar, who has no other claim on A. than that
of humanity."0
The reason it would be a mistake to interpret Moore as
endorsing Macaulay's view is that the reasons Moore gives for not
punishing omissions are not the same as those given by Macaulay.
In Moore's view, a wrong committed by omission is punishable only
if the wrong is sufficiently bad that morality and retributive justice
require punishment, and only if the importance of retribution
outweighs the interest in maintaining liberty.2 Macaulay's condition on punishment for omissions, by contrast, does not refer to
liberty and the degree of moral wrongness involved: where there is
no legal duty otherwise enforced through civil or criminal liability,
22
there should be no criminal liability for harmful omissions.
Hence, according to Macaulay, there is no liability, criminal or civil,
for failure to assist mere strangers in distress:

'9 See MACAULAY, supra note 18, at 493-97. This is especially true if the parties are
strangers. See id. at 497.
20 Id. at 495.
21 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 59.
2 See MACAULAY, supra note 18, at 493-97.
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A. omits to tell Z. that a river is swollen so high that Z. cannot
safely attempt to ford it, and by this omission voluntarily causes
Z.'s death. This is murder, if A. is a peon stationed by authority
to warn travellers from attempting to ford the river. It is murder
if A. is a guide who had contracted to conduct Z. It is not murder
if A. is a 23person on whom Z. has no other claim than that of
humanity.
Now, as an answer to the question of whether the law should
recognize a duty to warn or otherwise assist those who are, or are
about to be, in distress and in need of immediate assistance,
24
Macaulay's "special relationship" argument is quite unconvincing.
In effect, it merely asserts what we already know: that AngloAmerican law imposes no general duty, civil or criminal, to rescue
or give emergency assistance to strangers. The fact that the law
recognizes no civil liability or action in damages is not an argument
against the criminalization of such omissions. Perhaps there should
be civil liability for such omissions as well.
Moore's position, on the other hand, would seem to leave open
the question of the criminalization of omissions in cases where
special relationships do not exist, and it is this, I think, which
explains his ambivalence. What is important in Moore's test is not
so much the nature of the preexisting legal relationship between the
two people, but the gravity of the moral wrong that is done by one's
failure to act under the circumstances. 25 I take Moore's position
to rely on five propositions. First, the goal of the criminal law is
retribution: to punish moral wrong. What is necessary (but not
sufficient) for criminalizing any action is that it be morally
wrong. 21 Second, the law does not, and should not, punish failures
23

Id. at 495.

See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM To OTHERS 150-59 (1984). Feinberg contends that
Macaulay's argument here begs the question. See id. at 152-53.
25 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 59.
26 See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
24

CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).

Moore

summarizes the retributivist position as follows:
Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are
justified in punishingbecause and only because offenders deserve it. Moral
culpability ("desert") is in such a view both a sufficient as well as a necessary
condition of liability to punitive sanctions.... For a retributivist, the moral
culpability of an offender also gives society the duty to punish.... [W]e

have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.
Id. at 181-82. In a footnote, Moore adds: "'Moral culpability' as I am here using the
phrase does not presuppose that the act done is morally bad, only that it is legally
prohibited." Id. at 181 n.1. This is a serious qualification to his claim that moral
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to rescue strangers or to relieve them from distress, because we are
27
under no general moral duty to save, assist, or benefit strangers.
Third, the only exception in morality to this absence of duty is
where we can save a stranger without risk to ourselves, and with
only minimal inconvenience. So, while Camus is under no duty to
jump into the Seine to save a drowning woman, "[e]ven if the
chance of his own drowning was relatively small," 2' and while a
physician is under no duty to make a trip to save a dying person
whom only the physician can save,2 9 a passerby is under a moral
duty to throw a rope to a child in peril.3" Fourth, infraction of this
moral duty is not sufficient for criminal liability (and, Moore seems
to say, it should not be) because of "the value we accord to persons'
liberty to make the wrong choice.""1 It is necessary for criminal
liability, at least where there is a positive duty to act, that the moral
wrongness of a failure to act be of sufficient magnitude so as to
outweigh the infringement of liberty that criminal sanctions
invariably impose.12 Fifth, the value of liberty does not justify the
noncriminalization of a parent's failure to save her child from peril:

culpability is a necessary condition of liability. It implies that one is "morally

culpable," and deserving of retribution for violating laws criminalizing harmless, or
even morallyjustifiable, conduct. Perhaps Moore's point here is simply the familiar
one:27 that a breach of some law is a precondition to punishment.
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 55 ("We are not, in general, obligated to prevent
harm to others, and while it might be virtuous to do so on many occasions, morality
itself
permits us to be non-virtuous.").
2
s Id. at 54.
See id. at 55.
o See id. at 56-57. Presumably, the reason this last case is different from the first
two is the fact that there is an absence of risk and a very slight degree of inconvenience imposed on the passerby. Nevertheless, Moore's examples are ambiguous
here. He might be read as saying that the difference between the three cases is not
one of degree of risk and/or inconvenience, but the fact that in his third example a
child is involved. This would mean that Moore sees people as having a special moral
duty to rescue children, but not adults in similar danger, no matter how minimal the
inconvenience to the passerby. I hesitate to attribute this alternative reading to
Moore, since it rests on an arbitrary age distinction. What difference does the age
of the victim make, since in both cases we are dealing with a helpless person under
distressed conditions?
" Id. at 57. Here Moore's ambivalence about the duty to aid the distressed
becomes apparent. At least with respect to duties to children, he does say that while
a parent's duty to save her own child is of greater weight than a stranger's duty to
save someone else's child, he is "unsure that the balance is different enough that a
rightly conceived penal code would not punish both sorts of intentional omission."
Id. He seems to leave the door open to the question of whether the Anglo-American
rule ought to be changed to allow for the criminalization of certain omissions by
strangers, at least with respect to children.
S2 See id. at 57-58.
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the neglectful parent is criminally liable since the weight of the
positive moral duty to save her child is strong enough that it
33
outweighs the liberty to do wrong.
Given Moore's premise that the criminal law exists to punish
moral wrong, it is not immediately clear why considerations of
liberty should enter to defeat criminal liability for violations of
positive, but not negative moral duties. In both cases the law acts
as a restriction on natural liberty. Moore explains this discrepancy
between positive and negative duties, and why the law punishes acts
but not (most) omissions, by claiming that negative duties have
greater moral force than positive ones:
[W]e do want an act/omission distinction that has the potential at
least to carry some moral freight. The moral freight relevant here
is the moral difference between our negative obligations not to
make the world worse and our positive obligations to make it
better. Many sense, as I do, the very real difference in the force
of the two kinds of obligations.3 4
On this basis, Moore contends that the reason the failure to
rescue is not legally punished "lies in the differential force of our
negative obligations not to make the world worse, on the one hand,
and either our positive obligations, or our supererogatory ideals, to
make it better, on the other."35 He explains: "We do much more
wrong when we kill than when we fail to save, even when such
failure violates a positive duty to prevent death." 6 Moore responds to James Rachels's comparison between the uncle who lets
his young nephew drown in a bathtub in order to inherit the
nephew's fortune with the uncle who willfully drowns his nephew
for the same reason 7 by arguing:
[T]he first uncle is much less deserving of punishment than is the
second because the first did much less wrong. Wrongful as it is to
let the child drown, it is much more wrongful to drown the child.
Drowning it makes the world a worse place, whereas not prevent38
ing its drowning only fails to improve the world

as See id.
34 Id. at 25.
35
Id. at 54.
36 Id. at 58.
"TSee id. (citing James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia,292 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 78, 78-80 (1975)).
38 Id. at 58-59.
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One problem with this line of argument is the suggestion that
the reason the law does not criminalize (most) omissions of positive
duties is simply "the very real difference there is in the moral force
of our negative versus our positive duties,"3 9 which Moore rests on
the distinction between making the world a worse place and failing
to improve it.4" But if we generalize this as a justification for not
criminalizing omissions, it implies more than just the statement that
"[W]rongful as it is to let the child drown, it is much more wrongful
to drown the child." 41 It also implies that "Wrongful as it is to let
the child drown, it is much more wrongful to steal the child's purse
(or pacifier, or any other trinket)." This second proposition is
surely false, and it is false because its premise-that all negative
duties outweigh all positive duties-is false. Some infringements of
others' rights and privileges are trivial in comparison to the great
moral wrong we do in completely ignoring others and treating them
as if they (or we) did not exist.
To take Rachels's example again, surely my failure to save my
drowning nephew is morally worse than my breach of a legally
binding contract with his mother to sing to his sister and tuck her
into bed, or (to take a nonlegal example) my lying to my spouse
about my whereabouts last night. Perhaps I make the world a worse
place by breaching these obligations (suppose the child suffers from
insomnia as a result of my failure, or my marital deceit undermines
my marriage's integrity), but this is nowhere near the magnitude of
the wrong that I commit when I fail to save an innocent person at
virtually no inconvenience to myself. It is simply a false moral
principle that all acts that make the world a worse place outweigh
in wrongness all refusals to improve the world. Many failures to
improve the world enormously outweigh in moral heinousness many
acts that make it worse. Indeed, to describe such heinous wrongs
as mere "failures to improve the world" makes it seem as if one's
omission were somehow legitimate (in the same way as our not
joining in some community project, or devoting our lives to famine
relief, are legitimate because we have equally justifiable things to
do). The uncle's inactivity is not a simple -failure to improve his
s Id. at 58.
40 Moore explains, "If, as I shall argue in Chapter 10, omissions do not cause

anything, then when I omit to prevent some harm I do not make the world worse; I
only fail to make it better. Only when I cause that harm to occur-through my
actions-do I worsen the world." Id. at 28-29.
41 Id. at 58.
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nephew's status or well-being; it is a willful failure to prevent the
destruction of his well-being.
At most, Moore's arguments regarding the relative importance
of positive versus negative duties prove that acts that violate
negative duties are of greater moral significance than omissions that
violate their positive counterparts. Thus, killing is worse than
letting someone die, and stealing is worse than allowing another to
steal from a third party. It does not follow that letting someone die
is always worse than stealing. Moore's appeal to the relative
importance of negative over positive duties does not then establish
that omissions should be ignored by the criminal law, especially if
they result in great injury or loss to others. At most he has shown
that these omissions should be subject to lesser sanctions than
violations of negative duties that bring about the same results.
Failures to rescue resulting in death may not be murder or even
always homicide; that would depend on the circumstances and one's
mental state. Nonetheless in many cases they are wrongs serious
enough to warrant some degree of criminal liability.
II. THE DUTY TO AID THE DESTITUTE
The first step in any argument for a legal duty to rescue is to
establish some basis for distinguishing among positive duties. In
particular it must be able to differentiate between a duty to assist
the desperate or distressed and a more general duty of beneficence,
and finally between both of these duties and supererogatory actions
(actions that go beyond what is required or necessary).
Moore argues that we have no general obligation "to prevent
harm to others, and while it might be virtuous to do so on many
occasions, morality itself permits us to be non-virtuous."4 2 Moore's
position is contestable. Not only do we have a duty of beneficence
requiring that we prevent or remove harm to others on appropriate
occasions, or, as the case may be, that we take measures to promote
their welfare, but we also have even more exacting natural duties of
mutual aid, distinct from the general duty of beneficence. The
duties of mutual aid include both a duty to help the destitute on the
one hand, and a separate duty to give emergency aid to the
desperate and distressed on the other. There is a tradition within
which these duties are conceived, not as beneficence or duties of
charity, far less so as supererogatory actions, but rather as duties of
42

Id. at 55.
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justice. To say they are duties of justice does not necessarily imply
that they correspond to rights in the beneficiaries of these duties.
But, as is explained in the next Section, it does imply that these
duties are reasonable requirements on social cooperation which are
nondiscretionary and which always apply under the appropriate
circumstances. In this Section, the duty to aid the destitute is
discussed, primarily to distinguish it from this Article's primary
concern, the duty to give emergency aid to the distressed.
Consider the following statement by that supposed friend of
libertarians and forebear of natural property, John Locke:
But we know God hath not left one Man so to the Mercy of
another, that he may starve him if he please: God the Lord and
Father of all, has given no one of his Children such a Property, in
his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but that he has
given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods; so
that it cannot justly be denyed him, when his pressing Wants call
for it. And therefore no Man could ever have a just Power over
the Life of another, by Right of property in Land or Possessions;
since 'twould always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his
Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his
Plenty.4
Locke has in mind here something more than the doctrine of
necessity. In the criminal law, necessity can (theoretically) be a
defense to a charge of theft if the theft was necessary to save oneself
from starvation." But necessity does not imply a positive duty on
the part of the propertied to save the destitute from starvation.
Rather, it simply suspends normal property rules regarding the
crime of theft. This seems to be what Hume had in mind when he
argued that under conditions of emergency and extreme necessity,
such as famine or shipwreck, the "strict laws of justice are suspended" with respect to property: "[E]very man may now provide for
41 LOCKE, supra note 16, at 170 (emphasis added). Somewhat incongruously to
our minds, Locke goes on to say, in the same paragraph, that "Charity gives every
Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want,
where he has no means to subsist otherwise." Id. For this reason and others, the
natural duty to help the destitute does not correlate with a right in beneficiaries.
44 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, § 50, at 382. The doctrine is rarely, if ever,
applied in actual practice as a defense to larceny. Evidently one would have to be on
the verge of death (too weak to steal in effect) to justify theft in the name of
necessity. See id. at 384 (citing State v. Moe 24 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1933) (refusing to
allow the defense of economic necessity for rioting and larceny); Rex v. Holden, 168
Eng. Rep. 607 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1809) (referring to the execution of "very distressed"
persons for forging bank notes)).
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himself by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity
45
permit."
The reason I think Locke goes beyond Hume and the legal
doctrine of necessity here, and posits a (moral) duty to come to the
assistance of the destitute, is that his most basic political principle,
his "first and fundamental natural Law," is "the preservation of the
Society, and.., of every person in it." 46 Consistent with this, Locke
refers to that relief which "God requires [a man] to afford to the
47
wants of his Brother."
If this is correct, then we have John Locke-the purported
originator of the laissez-faire doctrine of natural property-claiming
that the rights of property do not extend so far as to entitle their
possessor to allow the destitute to perish. One has not just a duty
to save the destitute, it is, Locke says, their "right." Why did so
much of modern moral and legal theory lose this sense of moral
urgency about the status of the destitute? I suspect the reason is to
be found in the demands of capital and the economic inefficiency
of preserving

and maintaining the destitute, leading Hume's

successors, Malthus, Bentham, and the classical utilitarians, to argue
against the relief of the poor.4 8 Contrast the attitude that supports
45 DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 186

AND

(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1975)

(1777).

46 LOCKE, supra note 16, at 355-56. As Locke explains, "Every one as he is bound
to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his
own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve

the rest of Mankind." Id. at 271.
47 Id. at 170; see also JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY 131-32, 137 (1980)
(discussing the natural duty of relief to the distressed in Locke).
-8See ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE 229-30, 332-59 (1988)
(discussing the classical economists' views of the deleterious effects of welfare on
efficiency and the labor supply, and on self-reliance). Goodin quotes Reverend
Joseph Townsend, who, as early as 1787, warned that "to promote industry and
economy it is necessary that the relief given to the poor be limited and precarious."
Id. at 229; see also MARK BLAUG, The Myth of the Old PoorLaw and the Making of the
New, 23J. ECON. HIST. 151-56, 173 (1963). Blaug discusses the classical economists'
influence in enacting the "'harsh but salutary' Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834,"
which denied relief to the able-bodied except under conditions of extreme necessity.
Id. at 151. Charles Murray has revived the classical economists' attack on the Poor
Laws in his influential book. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984). Murray says: "Premise 1: People respond to
incentives and disincentives. Sticks and carrots work. Premise 2: People are not
inherently hard working or moral. In the absence of countervailing influences,
people will avoid work and be amoral." Id. at 146. Characteristic of the New Right
and the classical economists which they follow, the policy that Murray suggests implies
sticks for the poor, carrots for those better off.
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Locke's further claim:
[A] Man can no more justly make use of another's necessity, to
force him to become his Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God
requires him to afford to the wants of his Brother, than he that
has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his
Obedience, and with a Dagger at his throat offer him Death or
49
Slavery.
The classical economists' doctrine of laissez-faire not only sanctions,
but requires that we "make use of another's necessity" if resources
are to be put to their most effective uses and we are to maximize
wealth. Given that way of thinking, any duty to assist the destitute
must go by the wayside.
This Article argues that any moral theory that omits the duty of
mutual aid, or either of its components, is fundamentally flawed.
Moreover, any legal system that does not in some way enforce these
moral duties is also flawed. Moral duties of mutual aid are matters
of minimal decency, required as a matter of mutual respect for the
humanity of others. As such, there is a sense in which the duties to
help the destitute and the distressed are duties of justice. ° This
is not to say that it is a matter for retributive justice and the
criminal law to enforce the duty to aid the destitute. There are very
good reasons for not holding Macaulay's physician criminally liable
for failing to save the starving beggars of India.5 1 Anyone in his
situation would be overwhelmed by such a duty, and everyone, no
matter what means they took, would be in violation of it. The duty
to help the destitute is not a duty of self-sacrifice. There is in fact
little that we as individuals can do to help the destitute (except in
emergencies, and then the relevant duty is the duty to aid the
distressed). The problem of destitution is largely one of background justice, of the inability of prevailing economic and property
schemes to provide adequately for the basic needs of all individuals.
As a problem of background justice, alleviating destitution requires
large scale coordination of everyone's activities to make possible the

49 LOCKE, supra note 16, at 170; see also TULLY, supra note 47, at 131-32, 137, 15776 (arguing that these passages are incompatible with laissez-faire capitalism, and that,
for Locke, one role of government is to provide for the basic necessities of each
person).
'o For a discussion of the natural duty ofjustice, see RAWLS, supra note 16, at 33342. Rawls argues that natural duty and obligation "are an essential part of a
conception of right: they define our institutional ties and how we become bound to
one another." Id. at 333.

51See MACAULAY, supra note 18, at 496.
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institutionalization of cooperative public assistance schemes that call
upon everyone to contribute their fair share to mitigate the
problem. Our natural duty to help the destitute is then for the
most part satisfiable only politically; it is not adequately dealt with
by individuals or by voluntary charitable associations. This duty
then merges with the duty ofjustice, to put into place and support
political institutions that correct for the effects and limitations of
private transactions so that the basic needs of all individuals may be
provided for. This is Kant's point when he says:
The general Will of the people has united itself into a society
in order to maintain itself continually, and for this purpose it has
subjected itself to the internal authority of the state in order to
support those members of the society who are not able to support
themselves. Therefore, it follows from the nature of the state that
the government is authorized to require the wealthy to provide the
means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide the most
necessary needs of nature for themselves.... [T]hey have bound
themselves to contribute to the support of their fellow citizens,
and this is the ground for the state's right to require them to do
so....

As for children abandoned because of poverty..., the state
has the right to charge the people with the duty of not letting
them perish knowingly .... 52
Kant, like Locke, is within the natural rights theory of the social
contract tradition. But he transforms Locke's duty to help the
destitute into an institutional requirement that authorizes governments to put into place public assistance programs and charge
citizens with the perfect duty to support them. Kant is not original
here. Hobbes, in his prudential social contract doctrine, saw public
assistance as a legitimate and necessary government function:
And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to
maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to
the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth
as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Laws of the Commonwealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the
to expose
impotent; so it is in the Sovereign of a Common-wealth,
5
them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.s
The natural duty to help the destitute merges with the duty of
justice and implies a positive moral duty to support just schemes

52 KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note

53 THOMAS HOBBFs, LEVIATHAN

16, at 93-94.

239 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651).
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that provide for a decent minimum income to meet each person's
basic needs, as well as a duty to seek to bring such institutions into
existence when they do not exist. For reasons I have alluded to
above, neither of these duties are matters for criminal enforcement.
What is a matter for criminal enforcement is the requirement that
individuals contribute their fair share to the support of public
assistance schemes by paying the necessary taxes. Failure to pay
one's taxes to support the requirements of a just constitution is
among the omissions that are rightly punishable by the criminal law
in a just legal system. It is an omission that outweighs the wrong of
many other criminal actions.
The duty to help the destitute is then only indirectly enforceable
by the criminal law. It requires governmental action to put the
requisite institutions in place that enable us to satisfy this duty fairly
and effectively. It is also different from the duty to aid the
distressed, which, I will argue, is criminally enforceable in a way the
duty to assist the destitute is not. Unlike the duty to help the
destitute, this duty concerns the kind of emergency assistance that
can only be provided by individuals, not by long-term societal
provisions for the destitute. Although it is the role of government
to provide such public goods as emergency rescue, fire, ambulance,
medical assistance, and other protections, individuals, even if they
are able to do nothing else, should at least be required to alert these
assisting institutions once they are in place. I shall argue that it is
in this situation that the criminal law has a role in enforcing the
natural duty to aid the distressed.
III. KANT ON PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTIES

Before we can make sense of a legal duty to rescue, we must
first define the moral duty to aid the distressed on which it is based.
One standard objection to the criminalization of omissions is that
we cannot clearly define the duty to rescue in a reasonable and
enforceable way. 4 Even if it is conceded that we have a duty to
prevent harm to others, where within this general duty are we to
draw the line for purposes of the criminal law? If the callous
bystander can be held liable for failing to rescue an infant from a

wading pool, why isn't Macaulay's physician liable for failure to
' See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strlict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 198,
203 (1973).
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make a trip to perform an operation only he can perform?55 And
why should we not hold him equally liable for failure to save the ten
starving beggars who sleep on his street? If any omissions are to be
criminalized, the duty to undertake action must be clearly defined.
The immediate task is to distinguish a moral duty to help the
distressed from a more general duty of beneficence, to prevent or
remove harm, and to promote the well-being of others. To make
these distinctions, we first need a more refined typology than the
positive duty/negative duty distinction. Such a typology would
permit us to make better sense of a legally enforceable duty to come
to the emergency assistance of the distressed. Kant recognizes the
positive/negative duty distinction, or, as he often puts it, the
distinction between "duties of commission" and "duties of omission. "56 In addition, he draws further distinctions between types
of duties: perfect and imperfect duties, juridical duties and 7ethical
duties, and duties of justice as opposed to duties of virtue.
To take these up in reverse order, duties of justice are moral
duties which the state can, by right, enforce by the use of criminal
or civil sanctions.58 According to Kant, the state can, by right,
enforce moral duties only if they comport with his Universal
Principle ofJustice, which states: "Act externally in such a way that
the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone
according to universal law."59 For now, we will set aside the
meaning of this obscure principle. But for reasons discussed
later,"0 it does not mean that the role of government is to maximize liberty by minimizing the kinds of legal constraints on peoples'
conduct. Kant is not a libertarian. For as we have already seen,
among the positive duties of justice Kant recognizes is a duty to
contribute to political institutions to assist the destitute. 61 As
argued in Part V, Kant's principle of justice is best read in light of
his contractarianism: it assigns to some liberties greater value than
others because of their role in procuring individuals' basic needs
and independence.
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE

79 (James Ellington

trans., 1964) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES].
57 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16, at 18-21, 45-48.

See id. at 36-37.
9 Id. at 35.

0 See infra part IV.

61See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Duties of justice can be either positive or negative, but all are
both juridical and perfect duties. Juridical duties involve rules that
62
are enforceable by the use of legal or other kinds of sanctions.
They involve duties to perform or refrain from performing certain
actions. They apply to us without regard to our desires or ends.
They impose constraints on what we are permitted to do to promote
our interests (including our interests in others). Ethical duties
differ from juridical duties in that they require that we act from
certain motives. 6 They involve not (or not just) specified constraints on action, but the adoption of certain obligatory ends (such
as the happiness of others or our own self-perfection--Kant's two
primary cases).6 4 It is because ethical duties require that we adopt
ends and act from certain motives that they are not apt for legal
enforcement.6 5
By contrast, juridical duties require acts or
omissions irrespective of our motives, and so can be legally enforced
by sanction. 66 One can consistently act for reasons of self-interest,
and yet still satisfy juridical duties, simply to avoid punishment. 7
Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties
originates in Grotius 6 ' and Pufendorf,6 9 but, as with most ideas
he inherited, Kant refined it to a degree of sophistication not found
in its originators.7 0 Perfect duties, for Kant, are duties where a
62 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16, at 19.
63See id. (Kant uses the word "incentives" rather than "motives").

KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 43-46, 50-52.
65 See id. at 69-70.
6See
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16, at 19.
67 Still, not all juridical duties are duties ofjustice for Kant: they are not all by
right legally enforceable. Duties to oneself, such as the duties not to commit suicide,
to engage in self-abuse, or to impair one's capacities by drunkenness, are, for Kant,
"perfect"juridical duties of virtue. See KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note
56, at 82-90.
63 See GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 76 (William Whewell trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1853) (1625).
69See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1688), reprinted in 17
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 2, at 231-63 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather
trans., James B. Scott ed., 1934) (discussing the duties of man towards himself).
70 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supranote 16, at 46-48. On Kant's relation
to Grotius, Pufendorf, and the natural law tradition, see generally Jerome B.
Schneewind, Kant and NaturalLaw Ethics, 104 ETHICS 53 (1993). See also Jerome B.
Schneewind, Pufendorf'sPlace in the History of Ethics, 72 SYNTHESE 123 (1987). For my
account of Kant's distinction, I rely on John Rawls's unpublished lectures on Kant
given at Harvard during the Spring of 1980, and on John Rawls, Themes in Kant's
Moral Philosophy, in KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 81 (Eckhart Forster ed.,
1989). For informative discussions on Kant's typology, see generally ONORA NELL,
ACTING ON PRINCIPLE 43-58 (1975), and Thomas Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty and
Supererogation, in DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY 147
6See
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certain definite and specific kind of action (of omission or commission) is required. Imperfect duties require no specific kind of act;
instead they require that we adopt certain policies to realize the
obligatory ends imposed on us by ethical duties. In the free choice
and pursuit of our ends, we all are to follow plans of action that
give obligatory ends some appropriate weight and which are
rationally framed to promote them. In addition to requiring a
specific kind of action, Kant also seems to hold that perfect duties
are definite ("strict") with respect to their object or beneficiary and
to the circumstances under which they apply." Because perfect
duties are nondiscretionary, they apply whenever we are confronted
with these circumstances. 2 Imperfect duties, by contrast, are not
definite in some or all these respects. Being "imperfect" with
respect to one or more of the features that define perfect duties
gives us discretionary latitude in the choice of object, occasion, and
course of action. 3 Moreover, we are not always under a duty to
promote the ends imperfect duties require .
All juridical duties are perfect duties in Kant's view. Hence, all
juridical duties require specific kinds of actions, without regard to
one's ends. This is what makes them judicially enforceable. There
are some perfect (juridical) duties which the state has no authority
to compel under Kant's principle ofjustice. For example, we have
perfect duties to ourselves not to engage in self-deception 75 or to
commit suicide. 76 All duties to, oneself are duties of virtue,
including these duties of omission.
All imperfect duties, along with some perfect duties, are ethical
duties of virtue in that they require that we cultivate a motive to act
from an obligatory end. We have imperfect duties of beneficence,

(1992).
7' See KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 48, 71.
72 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 89 (H.J.

Paton trans., 3d ed. 1956) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK] ("[A] perfect duty
...

allows no exception in the interests of inclination ....

."). We are under perfect

(juridical) duties of omission never to kill, maim, assault, steal, or to engage in fraud
and deceit, etc., or to commit suicide, self-mutilation or self-abuse, or to allow others
to abuse us by violating our humanity (for example, agreeing to voluntary slavery,
serfdom, or perpetual servitude), see KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16,
at 98, and we have perfect duties of commission to keep our promises, and to provide
for and educate our children. See id. at 99.
73 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 48, 71, 109-10.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 90-92.
76See id. at 82.
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to benefit others according to our capacities, 77 as well as imperfect
duties to ourselves to develop our capacities and talents. 78 The
first of these duties require that we adopt the happiness of others
as an end; the second requires an end of our own self-perfection.
Both of these imperfect duties also require that we develop
dispositions to act in appropriate ways to promote these ends. The
duty to act from these dispositions and for these ends only
sometimes applies.7 1 It cannot be said that simply because I am
not at any particular moment either promoting others' happiness or
my own perfection that I am violating one or the other of these
duties. It may be that I am acting on some other (perfect) duty (to
keep a promise, aiding the destitute, etc.), or it may also be that I
am freely pursuing permissible ends that fall under neither of these
imperfect duties (for example, I may just be relaxing and watching
baseball on TV).
With Kant's typology in place, we can distinguish at least three
different kinds of duties that are important for our purposes: (1)
perfect juridical duties of omission (the duties not to kill, injure, or
cause undue suffering; the duty not to lie or deceive; the duty not
to steal or injure others' property, etc.); (2) perfect juridical duties
of commission (such as the duties to keep one's promises and
commitments, to provide for the security and basic needs of one's
children, and to relieve the emergency of the distressed so long as
we can do so at negligible risk and little inconvenience to ourselves);
and (3) imperfect ethical duties of commission (such as the duty of
beneficence (to promote the well-being of others), the duty of selfperfection (to cultivate and exercise our higher capacities and
talents),"0 and the duty of justice (to support and maintain just
institutions when they exist, and to assist in their establishment
when they do not).
While most legal duties are perfect duties of omission, many
others are perfect duties of commission. For example, we have a
legal duty to provide for our children, to care for our spouse and
parents in various respects, to keep those promises that rise to the
level of contractual requirements, and to fulfill civic duties such as
"See id. at 60, 116-19.
78 See id. at 108-11.
79 See id. at 109-10.
8o See PAUL GUYER, KANT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF FREEDOM 320-23 (1993)
(considering the various kinds of perfect and imperfect duties toward oneself that
Kant recognizes).
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jury service, military service, or maintaining our private property to
conform to local ordinances. Moreover, from the previous Section,
we know that Kant recognizes ajuridical duty ofjustice, to pay taxes
to support the destitute, as well as to support the other legitimate
functions of the state."1 One duty Kant does not anywhere seem
to mention as a juridical duty of justice is what I have called the
perfect duty to aid the distressed. Indeed he does not clearly
distinguish this duty of mutual aid from the general imperfect duty
of beneficence and discuss this as a separate perfect duty at all.
Still, I do not think that Kant's view would prevent legal liability for
failure to act on this perfect duty. That, I believe, is indicated by
his recognition of the institutionalization and legal enforcement of
2
the duty to aid the destitute.
Now, before proceeding, we should pause to consider that, to
some, Kant's refined typology may appear unmotivated. Indeed,
from a utilitarian perspective, these distinctions are arbitrary. For
utilitarians, there is nothing "imperfect" about the duty of beneficence in Kant's sense, for the principle of utility puts us under an
interminable duty to act so as to maximize social happiness as best
we can. There may be some utility value in distinguishing between
positive and negative, or perfect and imperfect duties for legal or
educational purposes, but in the end all our duties are subordinate
to the absolute claims of overall utility, which we are always under
a general duty to maximize. This follows from the teleological
conception of morality utilitarians adopt, that all that matters in
morality is the goodness of the states of affairs that are affected by
human choices.8 " If the goodness of states of affairs are all that
matter in moral assessment of action, then it is morally insignificant
whether one causes a state of affairs by her actions, or simply allows
it to come about by her inactivity. But suppose we think about
morality and justice differently, say in contractualist terms, as
providing reasonable constraints on people's actions as they freely
pursue their individual and shared ends, which constraints all can
freely accept as equals.8 4
Then the need for a more refined
typology of duty like Kant's becomes apparent. Kant himself goes
beyond contractualist morality, conceiving of it in terms of

" See supra part II.
812See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
83 See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 22-27.
' See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Contractualismand Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM AND

BEYOND 103, 110-28 (Amaryta Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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providing the optimal conditions for realizing the powers of
practical reasoning that underlie human agency. These powers
include our rational powers to critically reflect on our ends, decide
our plan of life, and schedule our activities accordingly; and our
moral powers to understand and abide by requirements of morality
and justice, and to justify our activities to others in these terms.
Kant's liberal concern for freedom and ethical autonomy explains
the role of the typology of duty within his view. But one does not
have to accept the Kantian view of morality to recognize the need
for a typology of the sort he offers. Any account of morality that
places independent value on individuals' freedom to decide their
activities and shape their lives, or on special commitments to
particular persons or causes, is going to need similar distinctions
among a range of duties.
With Kant's typology in place, let's return to Moore's claim
regarding the absence of a duty "in general" to prevent harm to
others. 5 Referring again to Macaulay's example, of the physician
who allegedly does not have a duty to save, 86 we can say that in
general Moore and Macaulay are right if their point is simply that
one cannot always be under a duty, moral or legal, to act to prevent
or remove harm to others even when it would be at no risk to one's
self. This policy would be supererogatory, even according to Kant's
view. Granted, a classical utilitarian might venture the view that our
duty of beneficence is exclusive, constant, and everpresent. We
have seen that the classic utilitarian view is not the only alternative
to the claim that there is no duty to act whatsoever.8 7 A third
alternative exists in which there sometimes is a duty to prevent or
remove harm to a stranger, or to promote her welfare, even if it is
inconvenient.
It is not clear from Macaulay's facts on their face whether the
physician has violated this duty. To determine the answer we have
to look at more than his omission and its immediate circumstances;
we also have to look to his present plans and his past history.
Suppose that Macaulay's physician has practiced for many years and
has never gone out of his way to help an indigent person or anyone
who was not his contracted patient. Moreover, he does not plan to
change his behavior in the future. (Assume that he is purely self-

See MOORE, supra note 1, at 55.
8 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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interested or that he is a libertarian who does not believe in a duty
of beneficence). Assume as well that this physician is about give up
the practice of medicine entirely, retire to Scotland, and devote the
remainder of his years to golfing at St. Andrews. In this case,
Macaulay's doctor might well have violated an imperfect ethical duty
of beneficence in refusing to travel ten hours to Meerut to save the
person that only he can save. According to the nonutilitarian
conception of the duty offered above, the doctor has a duty to
adopt the good of others as an end and to cultivate a disposition of
beneficence within himself so that he can occasionally fulfill this
obligatory end. His failure to adopt this end, to develop this
disposition, and to act from this disposition on this particular
occasion (by not removing the harm to a stranger despite the
inconvenience to himself) imply that he has violated at least the
duty of beneficence.
I am not arguing, however, that such a duty should be legally
enforced; nor would Kant. For Kant, the imperfect duty of
beneficence is unenforceable, since the motive and end that would
need to be adopted are not matters for legal regulation."8 Under
Kant's Principle ofJustice, the state has no authority to compel the
conscience, or to force the adoption of ends. The state only has the
authority to compel external action by way of enforcing perfectly
defined omissions or commissions." It is for the sake of promoting individuals' freedom and autonomy that Kant sees the duty of
beneficence as an imperfect duty. Kant's concern is to make it a
matter of an individual's discretion to choose when to fulfill this
duty and whom one should benefit as a result.9" But discretion in
the scheduling of beneficent activities to fit into one's freely
adopted plans does not mean this duty itself is a matter of discretionary choice. Discretion in scheduling beneficent acts is not to be
confused with having the discretion to wholly omit acting on the
duty of beneficence. Nor does it mean that preventing harm or
benefitting others is supererogatory. Undertaking uncommon risks
for the common good or the benefit of a stranger is clearly supererogatory. Often though, removing harm to another at no risk to
oneself is not supererogatory, but is simply a matter of fulfilling
one's natural duty.

8 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 38.
19 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16, at 34-35.
90 See KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 48.
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Supererogatory acts are acts of benevolence (giving gifts, favors,
etc.), mercy, heroism, or self-sacrifice. They are sometimes acts that
would be morally required under the imperfect duty of beneficence
or the perfect duty to help the distressed, were it not for the risk or
potential loss to the agent." Just as all negative duties do not have
priority over all positive duties, and all perfect duties do not have
priority over all imperfect duties, so too all duties do not outweigh
in moral import all supererogatory acts. This does not mean that
one can be under a duty to act supererogatorily. I mean rather that
sometimes one can be morally excused from failure to execute some
clear duty, if one's reasons for omission were some supererogatory
action of great importance. For example, purchasing Christmas
presents for poor children with my mortgage money may not
(morally) excuse my failure to repay my debt; purchasing the same
presents with escrow money entrusted to me by a pensioned widow
definitely does not. But flinging myself overboard to save a child in
a choppy sea is. sufficient justification for my failure to keep my
commitment to meet with young seaborne philosophers to discuss
their interests.
Duties are not then always morally prior to
supererogatory actions.
Contrast three very different examples: warning a blind person
nearby that he is about to step off a precipice; awakening neighbors
by phone to notify them their house is on fire; or rescuing a
drowning infant from a wading pool. In each of these cases, action
comes at no risk or inconvenience to oneself (assuming that one is
a normal and reasonable person). Moreover, the specific act one is
to perform is definite with respect to what one must do, when it
must be done, and who is to benefit from the action. Here we no
longer have cases of discretionary action. Not only is action in
these cases not supererogatory, but these actions also do not even
come under the imperfect duty of beneficence. One does not
require an obligatory end or benevolent motive in order to figure
out what to do and act accordingly. These actions are morally
required of anyone in the position to lend assistance. In cases like
these where appropriate actions are immediately apparent and welldefined, there is a perfect duty to help others in distress.

91See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 117.
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IV. THE NATURAL DUTY TO AID THE DISTRESSED
We have a duty to give emergency assistance to the distressedthose who are about to suffer or who are suffering some great
physical or mental injury or loss-when: (a) we have the clear
opportunity and are in a privileged position to give aid; (b) we have
knowledge of their jeopardy and knowledge of the means necessary
to relieve it; (c) we have the ability to directly relieve their distress
by immediate and well-circumscribed action; and (d) we can do so
at negligible risk, minimal costs, and at little inconvenience to
ourselves.
Because of these features, the duty to relieve the
distressed is a perfect moral duty of commission; it is a nondiscretionary duty to undertake appropriate actions of assistance, and it
applies to us whenever we are confronted with the requisite
circumstances.
The natural objection to imposing such a duty to relieve the
distressed is that it interferes with our discretionary plans and
activities, frustrates our expectations, and consequently limits our
freedom. But this perfect duty of commission often places far less
restriction on our freedom than do many negative duties enforced
by the law. For example, property laws prohibiting trespass restrict
freedom of movement and can cause great inconvenience to a hiker
lost in a snowstorm if the hiker is prohibited from the one path that
she knows leads to civilization. The hiker's freedom is limited far
more by the property rights of the estate owner than the estate
owner's freedom would be limited by a positive duty to assist by
allowing the hiker to pass over his land. Positive duties do not then
always limit freedom more than negative duties.
Now it may be true that, as a class, positive duties generally
circumscribe options (as distinguished from institutional liberties)
more than negative duties since they require that one undertake a
specific kind of action, whereas negative duties prohibit particular
kinds of actions, and otherwise leave one's options open.92 But
this generalization does not hold in many cases when specific duties
applied to specific circumstances are compared. The negative duty
to respect others' property imposes far greater constraints on the
options of the starving homeless person than the positive duties to
assist the distressed and the destitute impose on the options of the
comfortable property owner in a position to save her. The

' I am indebted to George Fletcher for raising this issue during discussion at the
Act & Crime Symposium at the University of Pennsylvania.
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distressed and the destitute, whatever their institutional liberties
may be, have no feasible options because of their desperate
situation. Their basic needs are in jeopardy and it is often negative
legal duties to respect others' property that immediately limit their
options. The solution to their situation is not to excuse them from
negative duties to respect others' property-though a defense of
necessity might be appropriate if they breached those duties.
Rather, the solution is the social recognition of duties and institutions designed to alleviate their desperate situation.
This means that it is a mistake to hold that greater liberty or
more options and opportunities are provided by minimizing moral
and legal duties so as to include only negative duties. A society
which imposes purely negative duties places far greater restrictions
on individuals' freedom and options than a society in which certain
positive duties are also recognized and legally enforced. We can
imagine a purely libertarian state in which power and property are
concentrated in the privileged that imposes only negative duties
protecting persons, property, and contracts, but which places
enormous restrictions on both the freedom and available options of
the masses. Due to their destitution, and because they do not
willingly accept the laws of a libertarian scheme, the majority of
people frequently are led to breach these laws, and are met with
increasing surveillance and repressive police action. It is mistaken
to say that, in this or any other libertarian realm, individual liberty
is "maximized," 94 or that "people interfere with other's liberty as
little as possible." 95 What these statements must mean is simply
that the kinds of duties individuals are subject to are restricted as
much as possible to negative duties. But limiting the kinds of duties
people are subject to does not correspond with minimizing the real
number of actual restrictions, legal or moral, on their conduct.
There is no clear correlation between being subject only to negative
duties and the liberal value of liberty.
A different objection to the duty to relieve the distressed is that
there is something unfair about being required to assist in case of
emergencies when others who are lucky 'enough not to be at the
scene have no duty to act. Some may say, "Why should I have to be

"' See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
175 (1988) (stating that "the idea of
libertarianism is to maximize individual freedom by accounting each person's person
as that person's own property").
9JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA

9- Id. at 32.
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the one to interrupt my trip on this rainy night and call an ambulance to the isolated scene of an accident?" The answer to this
objection highlights a major contractarian justification for a duty to
aid the distressed. Over a lifetime, we are no more likely to be
interrupted in our normal plans by having to assist another in
distress, than we are likely to meet with distress ourselves and to
require the emergency aid of another. Since the good realized by
a person from acts alleviating his distress far outweigh the effort
and costs others expend by lending emergency assistance, it is
reasonable for each person to choose and agree to a social scheme
where this duty is recognized over one where it is not."5 Indeed,
there is something irrational about rejecting this duty, for by
rejecting a duty of mutual emergency assistance as a reasonable
constraint on actions, one chooses a social world where one denies
oneself others' assistance at the very times one needs it the most.9 7
If so, there is nothing unfair about having to assist another once this
duty is generally recognized, for each person in society is as likely

6 During discussion at the Symposium, Professor Frances Myrna Kamm suggested
that, given the disparity between projected costs and benefits to each person upon
which the contractarian argument relies to justify a duty of emergency assistance, the
same argument might also seem to justify a perfect nondiscretionary duty of mutual
beneficence, one that would require us to lend assistance to others in distress even
at some risk and greater inconvenience to ourselves. Kamm's reading suggests that
Macaulay's physician might well be under a perfect duty to make the ten-hour trip to
Meerut. Indeed one might even be under a perfect duty to risk one's life to save
someone who is drowning. But to recognize a perfect, as opposed to an imperfect,
duty of mutual beneficence would be much more intrusive on people's freely adopted
plans. Indeed under some circumstances (such as those confronted by Macaulay's
physician in India) it would require that one perpetually act to prevent or remove
existing suffering and harms.
Given the far greater restrictions such a duty would place upon people's freedom
to pursue their plans and schedule their activities, I believe the contractarian
argument justifying a perfect duty of mutual emergency assistance could not be
extended to justify a perfect duty of mutual beneficence. What could be justified on
contractarian grounds-though I shall not make the argument here-is an imperfect
duty of beneficence, a duty to sometimes lend assistance at some risk and inconvenience to oneself.
'7 The argument I rely upon here is an adaptation of the fourth example in
chapter 2 of Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in which Kant argues that a more
general imperfect duty of mutual aid to relieve others' hardships is required by the
categorical imperative. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 72, at 90-91. For an
informative discussion of Kant's argument, see BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
MORAL JUDGMENT 45-72 (1993). While Herman does not distinguish a separate
perfect duty to the distressed, she argues that Kant's imperfect duty of mutual aid
requires that we always give aid when others' "true needs" are in jeopardy, if it can
be done at little or even "minor but real" inconvenience. Id. at 65-68.
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to derive greater benefit from reciprocal
recognition of this duty
98
than the burden it imposes on her.
The contractarian argument for the duty to aid the distressed
relies upon the idea of reasonableness that is characteristic of the
democratic social contract tradition. 9 It assumes that agents are
influenced by moral motives. They are moved not just by rational
nonmoral interests, but are predisposed to act reasonably and fairly,
with a desire to publicly justify their activities to others. 10 0 Now
it may be that the aforementioned argument also works within the
terms of a Hobbesian prudentialist contract view. 1 The purely
self-interested utility maximizer assumed by such a view also then
might be convinced that it is in her best interest to mutually accept
a duty to aid the distressed. Indeed, an argument for this duty
likely can be reformulated in utilitarian terms by weighing projected
aggregate costs and benefits. If so, this is an added benefit, for it
shows that the duty to aid the distressed is supported by the major
modern political conceptions of justice. Whether the democratic
contract argument that follows is amenable to Hobbesian and
utilitarian views is a different question.
This argument relies upon the extensive effect that general
recognition of the perfect duty to aid the distressed has upon the
moral quality of civic life.0I 2 Imagine a society in which this duty
was not recognized-or was even explicitly rejected-and emergency
assistance was seen as at best, benevolent or supererogatory, or at
worst, omission of emergency assistance became a matter of moral
indifference. There could be no general expectation that others
would come to our assistance at some of the very moments when we
are most vulnerable. We would then be able to have little confidence in strangers' good will, and no assurance that they are there
" Some may be led to infer from this discussion that I am relying upon utilitarian
reasons tojustify the duty to relieve the distressed. This would be a misreading. The
focus of the argument is on the reciprocal good, the good of each person, and not

the aggregate good of overall utility. Each person benefits from the duty of mutual
emergency assistance. This may be conducive to aggregate utility; then again it may
not be. Reciprocal benefit is not a condition of utilitarian justification.

" I assume the argument can be made behind the veil of ignorance of Rawls's
original position, or from the more informed perspective suggested in T.M. Scanlon's

contractualist view. See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 136; Scanlon, supra note 84, at 120.
"oSee RAWLS, supra note 16, at 139.
10'For a major modern restatement of the Hobbesian contract perspective, see

DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 157-89 (1986).
" See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 339 (declaring that "[a] sufficient ground for

adopting this duty is its pervasive effect on the quality of everyday life").
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to offer help when we and others we care for are in dire need.
Unlike the preceding argument, the issue here is not a question of
whether we ever actually need others' help or would directly benefit
from the duty of emergency assistance. The issue is one of the
worth society assigns to human life, the degree of respect people
have for each other, and the effect this has on one's sense of selfworth. Even for the most secure among us, there is an indirect
benefit just in knowing that one lives in a society where everyone
can trust everyone else's good intentions, and be confident that
others are there when help is needed the most. The absence of
such mutual assurance results in a gross impoverishment of social
life, since it diminishes trust in and respect for others, and perhaps
even one's confidence in one's own worth to others in society.
Granted, it is possible for society to exist without recognition of a
duty to assist the distressed, but it would be marked by a kind of
mutual disregard, perhaps even mutual disdain. Such a society
would be neither desirable, nor would it command the secure
allegiance of its members. For the sake of securing one's sense of
self-worth and the common good of mutual respect among the
members of society, it is then rational to agree to a duty of mutual
emergency assistance as a perfect duty.
I think that we do generally recognize a moral duty to aid the
distressed under the circumstances enumerated. It may not be
conscious or explicit, especially given the theoretical confusion of
this perfect duty with the imperfect duty of beneficence. But the
difference is marked by our moral responses to one who omits
assistance in a clear case, as opposed to one, such as Macaulay's
physician, who chooses not to act on the duty of beneficence on a
particular occasion. In the latter case, we think the omission
unfortunate; it may even be morally wrong, we have seen, if he has
never exercised his skills except to benefit his paying patients. But
assuming that he has, we are as likely to think his omission is
excusable, and maybe even justified, once we learn the reasons for
his failure to undertake beneficent action. But in a case with
negligible inconvenience where one neglects to assist the distressed
there is something morally outrageous involved: the person who
fails to do anything to rescue the helpless drowning infant, or who
intentionally omits to warn the blind man about to step off the
precipice, has acted in an inexcusable manner. We think him
warped, heinous, perhaps even evil. One's thought may be that the
world would be better off without such a person and that it is tragic
that it is not he, the wrongdoer, rather than the innocent person
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who suffered and perished as a result of the wrongdoer's neglect.
These natural responses illustrate the clear distinction between a
perfect duty to aid the distressed and the more general imperfect
duty of beneficence-to prevent or remove harm at some cost or risk
to ourselves.
V. A LEGAL DUTY TO AID THE DISTRESSED
It has thus far been argued that we have a natural moral duty to
lend emergency assistance to those in distress when we can do so at
no risk and minimal cost and inconvenience to ourselves. Now we
must consider our main issue: Should the perfect moral duty to aid
the distressed be legally enforced?
Not all perfect duties are, or should be, enforced by the criminal
or civil law. The general duty of fidelity, including the duties to tell
the truth, not to deceive, and to keep one's promises and commitments are all perfect duties. These more specific duties always
apply except when they are outweighed by some more stringent
duty. But no one would argue that all lies should be susceptible to
legal sanction. Normally fraudulent lies and lies that cause great
harm are subject to legal sanction, but there are all kinds of
misrepresentations that are not legally recognized. 10 3 Similarly,
while the civil enforcement of contracts is a condition of a stable
and productive economy, promises made without consideration are
normally not civilly or criminally enforced. Finally, if we accept,
with Kant, the existence of perfect duties towards ourselves, to the
"humanity" that is a part of our person, there are nonetheless good
reasons for not legally prohibiting self-deception, or even suicide
and attempted suicide.
Given that all perfect duties are not, and should not, be legally
enforced, should there be legal enforcement, under the criminal
law, of the perfect and positive duty to assist the distressed? Why
is it not like the case of the ordinary lie, or the broken promise?
The major difference between these wrongs and the wrong done by
failure to assist the distressed is the great loss suffered or harm that
results from one's failure to act on this positive duty. Most lies and
broken promises do not involve jeopardy to life or limb; if they did,
then it is likely that they would be criminally sanctioned. Failure to
10'For example, lying to one's spouse about careless financial dealings, or having

walked the dog; or lying to acquaintances about the large fish one caught (or that got
away).
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aid the distressed, however, does involve life-threatening jeopardy
and therefore, should be criminally sanctioned.
But here the argument that a legal duty to aid the distressed
limits liberty is more forceful than in the case of the moral
argument for that duty. The consequence of breaching a legal duty
of emergency assistance is not just moral sanction, but also coercive
legal sanction. Surely Michael Moore is right in subscribing to the
principle that there must be a special reason to limit liberty by
criminal sanction.1 0 4 Yet, what might this special reason be?
One cannot simply say here, and Moore does not, that a legal
duty to give emergency assistance to the distressed "unduly limits"
people's freedom simply because it imposes a positive duty to
act. '
"Unduly limits" in what way? This assertion can, at most,
be the conclusion of an argument that has yet to be made. All
criminal laws and most civil ones limit natural freedom. Primary
among the laws that limit liberty are those specifying property rights

and interests. Any property scheme (whether capitalist, socialist, or
something in between) is, by its nature, a complicated system of

rules specifying rights with correlative duties which place severe
restrictions on peoples' freedom. Yet we think there are sufficient

reasons of justice that justify such limitations on natural freedom
(assuming a property scheme is just). Hence freedom is not
"unduly" or unreasonably limited in these cases.
We have already seen that being under a moral duty to aid the
distressed involves only a minimal restriction of one's freedom of
action-that is built into the definition of the duty. As argued
earlier, the restriction on liberty that would be effected by the legal
enforcement of this moral duty is less than that of many criminally
enforceable duties. Moreover, a legal duty to the distressed does

not interrupt our activities and plans to a significant degree. Under
normal conditions, the number of times in a lifetime that one would

be called upon to act on this duty are few."0 6 All these reasons
should be familiar from the previous argument for the existence of

a perfect moral duty to aid the distressed.
Michael Moore contends that the reason we do not criminally
sanction a stranger's failure to prevent serious harm to another at
104This principle, while not enunciated by Moore, is the consequence of his
argument. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 57.
105Cf id.
106 The reader should think about his or her own life, and the times he or she has
been in a position to act on this duty.

1994]

DUTY TO AID THE DISTRESSED

1485

no risk and minimal effort "lies in the value we accord to persons'
liberty to make the wrong choice."1" 7 Moore's claim here is ambiguous. Surely there is no moral value in the "liberty to make the
wrong choice," if by that it is meant that there is independent and
intrinsic value in having the freedom to violate a natural moral duty,
negative or positive.
Indeed, if "intrinsic value" is understood to mean what is
desirable for its own sake, it is hard to see what could be the
intrinsic nonmoral value of such absolute liberty, since absolute
liberty includes a liberty to do what is unjust, even evil. A liberal
legal community does not assign intrinsic value to absolute, or
natural, liberty as such, the unrestrained liberty to do just as one
pleases. Instead it assigns value to particular liberties, depending
upon their significance in enabling individuals to realize their
capacities and basic needs, so that they can be suitably independent
and pursue their ends compatibly with others. A particular liberty
is valuable because it in some way is a condition of realizing some
morally legitimate need or interest, preventing some evil, or
promoting some permissible end.
On this account, some liberties (such as freedom of thought,
speech, and inquiry, liberty of conscience), in addition to being of
instrumental value to pursuing many permissible. ends (religious
faith, scientific inquiry, or entertainment, for example) may be
intrinsically valuable as well. For exercising these liberties is just
part of what it is to freely exercise one's reasoning capacities,
critically reflect on one's good, or become a free, autonomous
being.'
Other liberties, such as equal political liberties (the
freedom to vote, hold office, and present grievances, freedom of
assembly, or freedom to join or form political parties), if they are
not intrinsically good for the same reasons, are at least essential to
realizing one's legitimate interests. Without these liberties one
107 MOORE,
0

supra note 1, at 57.

16-17, 20-61
(1991) (Oxford 1859). Mill argues that freedom of thought, speech, discussion, and
inquiry, in addition to being means to uncovering falsehoods and discovering
knowledge of truth, are part of Individuality, which is the ideal that underpins his
liberal view. He characterizes Individuality in chapter 3 as containing two virtues,
"the Greek ideal of self-development" of one's higher capacities, and "the Christian
ideal of self-government" of one's activities in accordance with justice. Id. at 69-71;
see alsoJOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 289-371 (1993) (arguing that freedom of
thought and liberty of conscience are integral to the development and exercise of the
moral powers necessary for social cooperation: the capacity for a sense ofjustice, and
the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a rational conception of the good).
' 8 See JOHN S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
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would not be in a position to protect her interests from others'
overreaching or unreasonable conduct in legislation."0 9 Still other
liberties (such as the freedom of association, freedom of occupation
and of movement, freedom to own and dispose of possessions and
enter contractual relations for a variety of purposes) are instrumental to pursuing the wide range of permissible ends and commitments recognized by a liberal society. Finally, there may even be
some purely instrumental value in affording people the legal
freedom to commit certain moral wrongs. This would be one
explanation of why we do not punish all lies, breached promises,
and perhaps even failures to aid the distressed. But surely there is
nothing intrinsically valuable about the natural liberty to do wrong
by violating perfect and imperfect duties. To assign intrinsic value
to natural liberty as such would imply that legal restrictions per se
diminish this intrinsic value and that there is ethical loss with the
imposition of any legal restriction. But what could that loss be in
the case of legal restrictions on clearly unjust or evil conduct?
The sense, then, in which Moore must mean that we accord
"value ... to [the] liberty to make the wrong choice," ° is not that
absolute liberty is valuable as such, but that affording this liberty
legal protection is instrumental to promoting some other good.
Sometimes we must not punish morally wrong choices in order to
protect certain of the specific liberties mentioned above that it is
essential and important to retain. This explains why we do not
legally punish Scrooge's adamant refusal to recognize or act on the
imperfect duty of beneficence, since that duty, like all imperfect
duties, requires that one adopt a specific end, cultivate a beneficent
disposition, and exercise a certain kind of discretionary judgment
in scheduling this duty into one's plans and deciding when it
appropriately applies. Attempts to legally enforce these acts of
judgment and will, even if they could succeed, would require a gross
infringement of people's freedom to schedule their activities and
pursue their legitimate plans and projects. The price of maintaining
that important freedom for each person is likely a sizable number
of despicable characters like Scrooge, but it is a price worth paying
in view of the alternatives.

"oSee RAWLS, supra note 16, at 227-30. Rawls also contends that equal political
liberties and public recognition of one's status as an equal citizen are a condition of
realizing the good of self-respect. See id. at 544-46.

"' MOORE, supra note 1, at 57.
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No such reasons apply in the case of the failure to act on the
perfect duty to give emergency aid to the distressed. Acting on this
duty does not require adopting a beneficent attitude towards others.
The most self-interested of persons can be motivated to rescue a
drowning infant in a wading pool at little cost to his freedom of
action, so long as there are sufficient sanctions-positive or
negative-in place to induce that conduct. Nor does emergency
rescue require the exercise of discretionary judgment, or the
scheduling of one's activities. The circumstances under which this
duty applies are as clear-cut as many other legally enforceable
duties. The dangers of government exercising its prosecutorial and
coercive powers in ways that jeopardize or undermine legitimate
freedoms are not present as they are in the case of attempted
criminal enforcement of imperfect duties; the clearly defined
contexts in which this perfect duty arises render the danger of
government power and discretion impinging on legitimate freedoms
no more grave than it is under many duties that are currently
enforced. In sum, the usual reasons for granting a legal right to do
wrong are inapplicable to the case of the perfect duty to aid the
distressed.
If we accept a legal duty to rescue the distressed, however, what
impact will that acceptance have on the liberal principle that "liberty
shall be limited only for the sake of liberty?"'
If this principle
means that one person's freedom of action can be limited only for
the sake of creating even greater freedom of action among others,
then, taken just in that way, the liberal principle is surely false. For
there are all sorts of necessary limitations on people's freedom of
action that are designed to promote ends other than liberty. 2
. This principle is implicit in John Stuart Mill's Principle of Liberty: that a
person's freedom can be limited by coercive political power only in order to "prevent
harm to others." See MILL, supra note 108, at 68. Mill explains that "harm" means
injury to "certain interests, which ... ought to be considered as rights." Id. at 83.
The phrase "liberty can be limited only for the sake of liberty," comes from John
Rawls's A Theory ofJustice. See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 244. As Rawls makes clear
in both A Theoy ofJustice and PoliticalLiberalism, this phrase is intended to apply only
to certain basic liberties, and not to liberty as such. See RAWLS, supranote 16, at 24450; RAWLS, supra note 108, at 291-92.
112 For example, laws against trespass, theft, and destruction of others' goods
protect property and economic interests, not natural liberty as such. Restrictions on
obnoxious noise and public indecency protect people's sensibilities and piece of mind,
not their liberty. Content restrictions on speech prohibiting libel and fraud protect
people's reputations and their economic interests; restrictions on advertising protect

consumers' interests; and restrictions on the uses of property are enacted to preserve
public health, public convenience, and aesthetic considerations. Mandatory education
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I think the only way to make sense of the liberal idea that one
person's liberty can be restricted only for the sake of protecting
others' liberty is to see it as a principle that applies only to certain
basic liberties essential to maintaining our status as free, responsible
These liberties are
agents and equal, independent beings."' 3
essential to the development and exercise of the capacities for
various forms of social life, and for the free pursuit of rational
interests and legitimate projects. These liberties can be restricted
only under those circumstances where the competing liberties of
others are of greater importance and weight. "Natural liberty," or
an unrestricted "freedom of action" cannot, on anyone's account,
be a basic liberty; it is too broad and insufficiently defined. As we
have just seen, inchoate freedom of action is, indeed must be,
restricted for all sorts of reasons other than protecting basic liberty
if society is to be possible.
My sense is that however this list of basic liberties is drawn up
in the end, it will not include a liberty to violate perfect moral
duties. That liberty is just not of intrinsic or even instrumental
importance for liberal citizens. Nor will a list of basic liberties
require such a right for the effective protection of basic liberties.
It may indeed be the case that there are good reasons for not legally
enforcing many perfect duties (against common lies, for example,
or suicide, if there be such a duty), but these reasons will not be
because inchoate "liberty" itself is an intrinsic good worth protecting whatever the costs.
The legal duty to aid the distressed does not then violate any
essential basic liberty. Since we have no moral right to violate what
I have argued is a natural duty, I conjecture that a legal duty to aid
the distressed does not even restrict a significant nonbasic liberty.
A legal duty to aid does impose a minimal restriction on our

requirements restrict parents' and children's liberty so that children may develop
their capacities to become cooperative, flourishing, and productive members of
society.
"' For example, Mill holds that the principle of liberty is designed to protect
certain specific liberties including freedom of conscience, thought, speech, inquiry,
and discussion, freedom of tastes and pursuits, the freedom to plan one's life to suit
one's character, and freedom of association. It does not protect the freedom to use
one's property as one pleases, freedom of trade, etc. See MILL, supra note 108, at 1617, 106-07. Rawls also defines his first principle of justice as a "principle of equal
basic liberties," including liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; equal political
liberties; freedom of association; the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity
of the person (including the right to hold personal property); and certain rights and
liberties covered by the rule of law. RAWLs, supra note 108, at 291, 298.
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conduct, and it may well temporarily impede many from going
about their normal courses of business. Still, this restriction is
imposed in order to prevent or remove a great evil that occurs to
someone else.
Given its minimal restrictions and inconvenience,"' the fact that it avoids great harm to one person's
basic needs at minimal costs to another, and the significant fact that
each of us is about as likely to benefit from this duty as to be
inconvenienced by it, the political argument for the legalization of
a duty to aid the distressed is that it promotes a common good,
namely the safety and security of all persons in society. Since each
person is sufficiently likely to benefit from this legal duty at some
crucial point in their lifetime, it is a collectively rational legal
constraint. Moreover, since it enforces a preexisting moral duty,
does not unduly interfere with anyone's liberty, and has pervasive
effects on the moral quality of civic life by promoting mutual
respect and a sense of self-worth, it is also collectively reasonable.
A legal duty to aid the distressed should then be mutually acceptable to reasonable individuals and could be freely agreed to by them
as a legal constraint on the free pursuit of their plans and activities.
Return now to a familiar problem. One argument against
criminalizing omissions, particularly failures to aid the distressed, is
the slippery slope. Richard Epstein contends that there is no
principled way to define the limits of the duty to help the distressed
in unanticipated emergencies that are at hand, so we should not
start down the path of legally requiring aid even in clear-cut cases
of easy rescue." 5 Slippery slope arguments, however, apply
equally well to crimes of commission, or for that matter, to virtually
any practical decision. For example, is one a trespasser if she
hovers in a hang glider a foot above my land? Of course she is.
How about at 10,000 feet? Surely not. How about 1000, 999, 998,
...

and so on? The law against trespass and criminal law in general

has been effectively and fairly upheld despite these bothersome
possibilities.
.14
It is pure exaggeration to say, as some have, that we are likely to be interrupted
from our normal and legitimate business at any time by a legal duty to rescue, since
the occasions in a lifetime that one is likely to actually have to respond to this duty
are quite rare under normal circumstances.
115As Epstein says: "Once one decides that as a matter of statutory or common
law duty, an individual is required under some circumstances to act at his own cost
for the exclusive benefit of another, then it is very hard to set out in a principled
manner the limits of social interference with individual liberty." Epstein, supra note
54, at 203.
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Borderline cases are unavoidable in the application of virtually
any legal rule or moral principle for all of the familiar reasons:
vagueness, ambiguity of terms, disagreements over the weight of
conflicting reasons, and complex or insufficient evidence. At some
point, decisions just must be made between competing alternatives,
even absent a clear balance of substantive reasons compelling a
particular conclusion. Does this mean normative decisions are
arbitrary? Not at all. Indeterminacy affects the margins, not the
core applications of well-formulated rules and principles. What is
important is that we locate the range of decisions that are indeterminate-after critical reflection it is often much smaller than is
initially supposed-and then decide among them in a fair fashion
that comports with due process and the usual procedural requirements ofjustice. This is one of the primary arguments for majority
rule in legislative procedures: it is a fair principle of settlement of
issues that are substantively indeterminate from the standpoint of
justice.'16 It is also a good argument for a jury trial before one's
peers, and the requirement that they settle on guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
To address the familiar slippery slope argument, I have tried to
give sufficient schematic content to the duty to aid the distressed to
distinguish it from a more general duty of beneficence and
supererogatory action. Most often, decisions whether or not this
duty has been violated will be quite clear, and, as with any other
area of law, clarity will increase given a history of past decisions. Of
course, Epstein's and others' reticence regarding a legal duty to give
emergency aid might depend on something else, namely, the moral
concepts that must be applied if we are to make principled
distinctions that inform us when the duty to assist the distressed
applies. To apply this requirement in the borderline cases with
which he is concerned, we will no doubt at some point have to rely
on a hypothetical standard of reasonableness: what a reasonable
person would judge to be an unreasonable risk, expense, or
inconvenience that would discharge one from the legal duty to take
11 7
action to assist the distressed.
What does it mean to be a reasonable person? One can be
rational in the sense that he acts to best promote his interests and

116

See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 361-62.
supranote 24, at 153-54. Feinberg also suggests a reasonableness

117 See FEINBERG,

standard, although he develops it in a different manner than I propose. See infra note
119 and accompanying text.
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yet still not be reasonable. A rational wealth-maximizing corporate
executive may be quite unreasonable when he dissolves a profitable
firm to sell off its assets for his friend's greater gain, seizes workers'
unprotected pension funds, and puts them out of work. Reasonableness is not a category immediately available to economic
efficiency analysis. Insofar as it is to be understood within that
framework, it would have to be reduced to rationality, meaning,
what it is ultimately rational for an individual utility-maximizer to do
to minimize costs and maximize individual or social utility, perhaps
defined in terms of individual or social wealth."' But neither the
legal nor the moral concept of reasonableness can be derived from
nor reduced to the concept of rationality as conceived in economics
and the theory of rational choice. Instead, reasonableness is a basic
moral category that presupposes and supplements the concept of
rationality; it works as an independent moral constraint on rational
choice and individual or social utility maximization.
To be
reasonable is to be, in part, fair-minded. Thus, it is to be responsive
to the rational interests and plans of others, and attentive to the
individual reasons they have for doing what they do. It involves a
willingness to limit one's claims, and to constrain one's actions and
the pursuit of one's nonmoral interests (as measured by, say, a
utility function) according to rules that respect others' pursuit of
their rational good. A reasonable person, as I have argued,
recognizes and accepts duties of mutual aid on contractualist
grounds; he is willing to restrict the, wholesale pursuit of his
interests for the sake of preventing harm to another. A straight
utility- or wealth-maximizer is, by definition, unreasonable according
to this criterion. There are no considerations she recognizes as
118See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 130-33 (1990).
Posner characterizes a "reasonable decision" in terms of reasoning from precedents,
statutory language, and other conventional materials, and when these sources are
indeterminate, ajudge is to make a policy decision based on "a social vision," which
Posner suggests may be wealth maximization. Id. at 132 (stating that wealth
maximization is currently the "popular candidate" for "an overall concept of antitrust
law," but acknowledges that "itis, needless to say, a contestable choice"). Predictably,
Posner then defends the economic approach to law. See id. at 353-92. He argues that
[s]ince wealth maximization is not only a guide in fact to common law
judging but also a genuine social value and the only one judges are in a
good position to promote, it provides not only the key to an accurate
description of what the judges are up to but also the right benchmark for
criticism and reform.
Id. at 360-61. Here the concept of reasonableness is absorbed into an account of
economic rationality and wealth maximization.
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sufficient to constrain or deter her from the most expedient means
required to maximize individual or social utility and realize her
rational good." 9
Courts and juries make judgments about the reasonableness of
persons, conduct, and evidence all the time. There is no way to
avoid standards and judgments of reasonableness in a just legal
scheme. And there is nothing "unprincipled" about these judgments and standards. It is not unprincipled to instruct juries to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor is it unprincipled to
ask jurors to decide whether the legal duty to rescue has been
violated, by considering what the reasonable person would do under
the circumstances, given her assessment of the risks, costs, and
inconvenience involved. Fears that the legalization of a duty to give
emergency aid to the distressed is unjust because it is "unprincipled" are overblown. This Article has attempted to give that duty
sufficient content to support this conclusion.

19 See generally RAwLs, supra note 108, at 48-54; Samuel Freeman, Contractualism,
MoralMotivation, and PracticalReason, 88J. PHIL. 281 (1991) (discussing further the
concept of reasonableness in these terms).

